Counterterror, Technology, and Reaction
In the recent incident in Detroit, a homegrown, self-radicalized jihadist
attempted to blow up an aircraft on Christmas day by igniting explosives hidden
in his underwear. Since then, there has been the usual hue and cry concerning
bureaucratic accountability and a call for technology to help rescue us from
evildoers.
Although full body imagers are capable of identifying contraband hidden beneath clothing, there's no conclusive proof that they can locate articles stuffed in body cavities, much less the explosive powders used by the failed bomber. They're also large machines that take up valuable space in the bottlenecks that many airport screening areas have become.
Besides, it's a machine, not a panacea. The terrorists will eventually become familiar with its limitations. " Terrorists will easily evade body scanners," the American Civil Liberties Union argued recently. "The terrorist threat is a dynamic threat - terrorists react and adapt to security measures, and that fact must be taken into account in selecting those measures."
ivil aviation security is basically reactive. Passengers and their carry-on luggage began to be screened in the early 1970's in response to an escalating number of aircraft hijackings, mostly by homesick Cubans seeking a return to the island. The industry has retained that model ever since.
Although full body imagers are capable of identifying contraband hidden beneath clothing, there's no conclusive proof that they can locate articles stuffed in body cavities, much less the explosive powders used by the failed bomber. They're also large machines that take up valuable space in the bottlenecks that many airport screening areas have become.
Besides, it's a machine, not a panacea. The terrorists will eventually become familiar with its limitations. " Terrorists will easily evade body scanners," the American Civil Liberties Union argued recently. "The terrorist threat is a dynamic threat - terrorists react and adapt to security measures, and that fact must be taken into account in selecting those measures."
ivil aviation security is basically reactive. Passengers and their carry-on luggage began to be screened in the early 1970's in response to an escalating number of aircraft hijackings, mostly by homesick Cubans seeking a return to the island. The industry has retained that model ever since.
When Richard Reid tried unsuccessfully tried to ignite explosives hidden in
his shoes on an American Airlines flight in December 2001, the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) reacted with emergency
rulemaking almost immediately. Without undue debate, they imposed (rather
artificial) limitations on the amount of liquid one could carry on
aircraft. Mr. Reid's efforts eventually had the rest of us padding through
screening lines shoeless.
Much of what constitutes aviation security today is a direct result of
reactions to attacks, whether successful or attempted. The process of
action equals reaction began with the FAA and was adopted by its successor
agency, the TSA. This reactive approach does make the system more secure.
The screening devices work as advertised. Deploying a "new" technology also
makes people feel safer. The government is doing something; we feel better.
But more secure isn't the same as foolproof. More attacks will be attempted
and some will be successful. Not everyone can be protected all the time.
The fatalistic recognition of vulnerability shared by citizens of other
countries is not as acceptable to the American ethos. No elected official
will ever admit our vulnerability; few Americans are prepared to accept it.
For more information, click here.
For more information, click here.